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Introduction
Twenty years after the handover of sovereignty, China is still wrestlingwith its nation-building project in Hong Kong. Resumption of Chinesesovereignty over this former British colony has not smoothly nurtured a
robust Chinese state nationalism that refers to national allegiance to and pa-
triotic sentiment toward the Chinese state. While China has been pressing for
state loyalty and Chinese national pride in Hong Kong through national educa-
tion (Tse 2014) and political propaganda (Chan and Chan 2014), local civil so-
ciety exhibits escalating China–Hong Kong conflicts in terms of political reform,
socio-economic integration, and cultural tension (Chan 2014). The China-Hong
Kong conflict has even been radicalised as discourses of localism, Hong Kong
sub-nationalism, or even Hong Kong independence, which defies China’s influ-
ence and efforts regarding Hong Kong’s democratisation and civil liberties (Chan
2017; Fong 2017). In this article, the questions we would like to answer are:
why is China’s state nationalism still an “unfinished project” in Hong Kong?
What are the factors that hinder it? What are the momentums behind contro-
versies relating to Chinese nationalism in post-handover Hong Kong? 
We tackle the above questions by drawing upon the ethnic-civic dialogue
of nationalism. The findings of Hong Kong identity surveys from 2010 to
2016 show that Chinese state nationalism mainly rides on people’s pride
in Chinese ethnic icons that are imbued with cultural and linguistic ties to
the Chinese motherland. Meanwhile, civic values—referring to the degree
of freedom that Hong Kong people take pride in—that have long been trea-
sured by Hong Kong people do not contribute to their pride in Chinese state
icons. Disarticulation of civic values hence becomes the major discourse or
controversy that is mainly used to summarise the disputes in China-Hong
Kong conflicts in the course of China’s assertion of state nationalism over
the city. Yet, the findings also demonstrate that positive perceptions of Hong
Kong’s cultural icons and civic values do not directly or necessarily result in
resistance against Chinese state nationalism. The findings indicate that
emergent localism and sub-nationalism are unlikely to become mainstream
discourses upheld by residents of Hong Kong. 
In sum, this article empirically illustrates the limitations of state nation-
alism that relies largely on ethnic appeal but little on articulation of civic
values. We also contend that Hong Kong people’s embrace of local icons
such as the Cantonese dialect, and pursuance of civic values such as free-
dom and human rights, do not directly result in resistance against Chinese
state nationalism. Yet given China’s growing assertion of state nationalism
and policies that ignite public concern over civic values and local culture,
we should anticipate upcoming China-Hong Kong cultural conflicts and
their consequences on Chinese state nationalism. 
Conceptually speaking, Chinese state nationalism in post-handover Hong
Kong provides a case study revisiting the ethnic-civic dialogue of national-
ism. It shows how the ethnic appeal of nationalism is working on a highly
modernised city with entrenched civic values. It illustrates the fundamental
incongruence, if not contradiction, between the ethnic appeal of Chinese
nationhood and civic values of human rights and liberties. Such ethnic-civic
tension will plausibly result in further uncertainties regarding China’s na-
tion-building project in Hong Kong. Chinese state nationalism in Hong Kong
hence provides an empirical case study to examine scholarly questions that
contemplate the formation of nationalism and national identities. 
Nationalism: An ethnic-civic dialogue
Understanding nationalism, nationalisation, and national identity has been
a complex construct that cuts across cultural studies, political science, phi-
losophy, sociology, psychology, history, and various theories of modernisa-
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ABSTRACT: Drawing upon the ethnic-civic dialogue of nationalism, this article shows how Chinese state nationalism disarticulates from the
civic values of Hong Kong in the post-handover years. Surveys from 2010 to 2016 in general reveal a dwindling pride in Chinese state nationa-
lism in Hong Kong, and its disarticulation from the treasured values of civic rights and qualities in the city. As seen in this study, Hong Kong
Chinese articulation of nationalism in the form of Chinese ethnic icons shrank throughout the study period. The same study also shows that
neither civic values nor cultural pride in Hong Kong are conducive to the building of Chinese state nationalism, nor are they a significant im-
petus to cultural resistance against China’s nation-building project in Hong Kong. The article empirically shows the limitation of nation-buil-
ding, which relies mainly on ethnic appeal but less on civic dimensions. It also discusses to what extent the ethnic-civic dialogue of nation-buil-
ding could inform Chinese state nationalism and resistance to it in post-handover Hong Kong.
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tion. Put in simpler term, the cultural aspiration of an imagined feeling of
belonging to a nation is coined as nationalism; its formation is nationalisa-
tion, and its implications for cultural positioning and practices can be seen
as the people’s national identity. Academic dialogue regarding these con-
cepts has revealed substantial and concrete political implications for na-
tionalist movements: the breaking up of multi-national and colonial
emperies, national unification and expansion, and even the restoration of
ancient states (Geller 1983; Nairn 1977). Nationalism thus matters sub-
stantially to the social engineering of nation-building, which is inextricably
tied to the establishment or replacement of governing regimes and their
political legitimacy. 
Formation of nationalism is closely associated with the rise of the nation-
state since the Enlightenment period. Modernist theories and studies reveal
that the political, socio-economic, and cultural shifts initiated by mod-
ernising forces have laid down foundations for the building of nation-states,
the proliferation of nationalistic ideas, and the disruption of the traditional
social order, including industrial capitalism, public education, social bureau-
cratisation, and Kantian ideas of self-determination from the Enlightenment
(Smith 2010: 49-53). The modernist approach attributes nationalism to the
cultural formation of citizenship, civic rights, and codes, which imbue na-
tionhood with specific political sovereignty and national boundaries (Geller
1983). In short, modernists perceive nationalism as a constructionist process
that conveys a sense of solidarity through civic participation and values
(Smith 1996). Nationalism is hence a historical contingence given the rise
of citizenship, civic values and rights, and nation-states since the Enlight-
enment era. However, the modernistic explanation hardly explains the ex-
istence of pre-modern nations and the blind, strong empathy and emotions
relating to nationalism. In this regard, primordial origins offer an alternative
version of the rise of nationalism: solidarity based on shared blood ties or
biological roots, or the national glory and totems that are enshrined in com-
mon cultural and historical origins (Smith 2010: 55-60). These ethnic icons
contain condensed cultural and historical meanings triggered by reactionary
anxiety to foreign dominance and other entities of nationalism (Naire
1997). The aforementioned scholarly deliberation of national imagination,
its sources, political legitimacy, and social consequences are henceforth
conceptualised as expressions of ethnic-civic nationalism. 
While envisioning a dialogue on civic nationalism (nation-building based
on citizenship, civic rights, and values) and ethnic nationalism (nationalistic
passion hinged on historical glories, blood ties, and biological roots), both
the aforementioned modernist theories and primordial discourses unravel
a number of vital social thrusts that facilitate statist leverage for nation-
building, such as the ideological apparatus of education systems, the ad-
ministrative apparatus of urban management and population control, the
economic apparatus of taxation, the construction of national myths, bio-
logical roots, historical glories, and totems. To different degrees, depending
on the specific context, these modern state apparatuses and primordial ori-
gins pave the way for nation-building projects initiated by statist manoeu-
vres. Apart from the statist construction of nationhood, consciousness of
national identity also stems from lived experience at the grassroots level,
which has been called ethno-symbolism and reiterates the subtle but per-
sistent impact of everyday life practices on the formation of national con-
sciousness. Michael Billig emphasises habitual cultural reproduction as an
illustration of a “banal nationalism” through which people internalise na-
tional awareness and identity: cultural practices such as hoisting national
flags over public buildings and the use of a specific language are typical in-
stances (Billig 1995). Benedict Anderson’s outlining of a notion of an “imag-
ined community” has documented how the paradigm shift of linguistic
usage based on print capitalism and the formation of cultural communities
stemming from vernacular nationalism combine to give rise to national
consciousness (Anderson 1983). Statist construction of nationhood and the
everyday cultural experience of the people are therefore significant factors
in the ethnic-civic dialogue of nationalism. 
Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong
The ethnic-civic dialogue of nation-building is manifested in the evolution
of Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong. Chinese nationalism in colonial Hong
Kong exhibited a substantial ethnic appeal and the historical glory of Chi-
nese nationhood, and demonstrated cultural resistance against colonial
domination by “the West.” Despite the constitutional separation from China
during the colonial period, Hong Kong society was susceptible to various
occasional political or statist mobilisations in the name of Chinese nation-
alism and its ethnic history. Hong Kong was a significant fund-raising base
and safe haven for Chinese dissidents and political refugees who wrestled
with the Manchu imperial Qing court in their efforts to restore a Han regime
in China (Tsang 2007: 73-83). In 1925, propelled by zealous Chinese nation-
alism and labour disputes between Chinese workers and British troops in
Shanghai, masses of Chinese workers in Hong Kong joined the Canton-Hong
Kong strike that shook the colonial rulers, business elites, and the wider so-
ciety (Tsang 2007: 84-101). A modern well-known saga of extended Chinese
nationalism in Hong Kong involved the 1967 riots. Spearheaded by Maoist
supporters of the Cultural Revolution in Communist China (1966-1976) who
discredited colonial Hong Kong as an oppression of Western colonialism,
Hong Kong experienced a period of social unrest, chaos, and the overwhelm-
ing shadow of being taken over by its Communist neighbour, although the
event eventually ended thanks to the restrained approach of Mao’s regime
and the rigorous suppression of Maoists by Hong Kong’s colonial regime
(Yep 2009). Colonial Hong Kong continued to display calls for Chinese na-
tionalism and its ethnic identity. Notable examples included protests
against the territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Diaoyu Is-
lands and the movement to recognise Chinese as an official language in
Hong Kong, which frequently evoked Chinese folklore and the ethno-cultural
ethos of a kind of pan-Chinese sentiment (Vickers and Kan 2003). 
The ethnic appeal of Chinese nationalism nevertheless encountered a
growing Hong Kong identity in the late colonial period. Hong Kong’s desire
for a sense of belonging to its own territory and its particular way of life fur-
ther fostered a distinct cultural identity as colonial Hong Kong started ex-
periencing economic upturn and a widening gap in living standards with
mainland China in the 1970s (Mathews, Lui, and Ma 2008). More impor-
tantly, Hong Kong identity has gradually demonstrated civic values that go
beyond the ethnic appeal of Chinese nationalism. The development of polit-
ical discourse in Hong Kong took a more progressive stance toward
democratisation and liberties after the constitutional reforms of the late
colonial period, as a result of which the British regime was able to introduce
directly-elected seats to the legislature (Ku 1999: 92-198). The desire for in-
stitutional reforms in favour of democratisation, civic liberties, and related
growth in the political sphere has continued in the post-handover years (Ma
2007: 94-134). In the face of unremitting social aspirations for democrati-
sation and civic liberties, however, China has been widely framed as the
major political force barring Hong Kong from democratising its constitutional
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structure and exercising civic rights. China’s trump cards are local pro-China
groups and business and industrial leaders combatting local democrats, and
tycoons buying out Hong Kong media and thereby controlling the public
voices in Hong Kong (Fong 2014; Hong Kong Journalists Association 2014).
Despite the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China in 1997, the rise
of China’s geopolitical power since the 1990s, and the growing socio-eco-
nomic interaction between Hong Kong and China in the post-handover years,
the notion of Hong Kong identity has continued to represent cultural resis-
tance against the looming Chinese regime (Fung 2001, 2007). 
In addition to the civic values explicated by Hong Kong identity, the ethnic
appeal of Chinese nationalism has also received controversial feedback in
Hong Kong owing to local residents’ puzzled or ambivalent (mis)perception
of mainland Chinese people. Given the varying pace of modernisation and
incongruence in terms of civic values, Hong Kong people’s acknowledge-
ment of themselves as Chinese nationals does not necessarily imply their
embrace of immigrants and visitors from mainland China. Chinese in main-
land China have been hovering between the position of “cultural other” and
cultural affiliation to Chinese nationalism throughout the formation of
Hong Kong identity (Lau 1997; Ma and Fung 2007). This paradoxical identity
politics is fully manifested in disputes over the abode rights of mainland
Chinese in Hong Kong, in which local public opinion calls for controlling
residency in Hong Kong and stricter border control in order to avoid sharing
social resources with people from mainland China (Ku and Pun 2004). Past
surveys have shown that Hong Kong residents perceive mainland Chinese
as less politically motivated and with lower civic qualities (Ma and Fung
1999). The unintended socio-economic consequences of trans-border in-
teraction between China and Hong Kong, such as the influx of tourists from
China and of Chinese capital for goods and services in the post-handover
years, has further aggravated cultural resistance to mainland Chinese and
Chinese identity by locals in Hong Kong (Chan 2017).  
Revisiting Chinese state nationalism
In short, Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong has been counting on the eth-
nic ties of Chinese nationhood and China’s historical links, and is less re-
sponsive to the civic values of political rights and liberties embedded in the
Hong Kong identity. This cultural incongruence has been further exposed
by the statist manipulation of Chinese nationalism in the post-handover
years. Chinese nationalism has become a pragmatic political means for the
Chinese state to call for national unity, ruling legitimacy, and support for
national greatness (Zhao 1997). The incongruity between the values of civil
liberties and the nationalistic appeal for political allegiance to a specific
Chinese state has paved the way for conflicting dynamics between Chinese
nationalism and Hong Kong identity. Such discursive struggles and political
contestations are vividly manifested in the implementation of national ed-
ucation in Hong Kong. Although the Chinese and Hong Kong governments
are attempting to articulate a Chinese nationalism that engenders appre-
ciation of and affection for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the
school curriculum of Hong Kong, this renationalisation project has encoun-
tered persistent resistance from civil society and an alternative attribution
of Hong Kong citizenship that values global citizenship and civil liberties
(Tse 2011). Another example is the political controversy surrounding the
process of democratising the election of the Chief Executive: when China
reiterated that only those who are loyal to the PRC could rule Hong Kong,
local public opinion responded by asserting a liberalistic interpretation of
state allegiance (Chan and Chan 2014). Statist manipulation of Chinese na-
tionalism demonstrated a tendency toward centralising power that erodes
the local autonomy of Hong Kong by deterring democratisation, the exercise
of liberties, and practices of international protocol (Fong 2017). Simply put,
the ethnic appeal of Chinese nationalism has become a Chinese state na-
tionalism that demands the political allegiance of Hong Kong people to the
Chinese regime. 
The Hong Kong story of Chinese state nationalism is therefore a case
study that could provide an empirical account to illustrate the ethnic-civic
dialogue of nationalism by raising the following research questions:
• To what extent has China successfully promoted Chinese state national-
ism in post-handover Hong Kong?
• To what extent is Chinese state nationalism compatible with the civic
values of post-handover Hong Kong?
• To what extent is Chinese state nationalism compatible with Hong Kong
identity?
These research questions explicate the compatibility between Chinese
state nationalism and Hong Kong identity, in particular whether statist al-
legiance to the Chinese regime can incorporate the civil values of Hong
Kong. Drawing upon Hong Kong identity surveys from 2010 to 2016, the
following parts of this article will examine the correlation between Chinese
state nationalism, the civic values of Hong Kong, cultural icons representing
Hong Kong identity, and the ethnic appeal of Chinese nationhood. We will
discuss the juxtaposition of the civic values of Hong Kong and the ethnic
appeal of Chinese nationhood in the formation of Chinese state nationalism
in Hong Kong, and its implications in the ethnic-civic dialogue of national-
ism. In particular, we are interested in whether and to what extent the civic
values of Hong Kong are contradictory to the proliferation of Chinese state
nationalism in post-handover Hong Kong. 
Research methods
To delineate the formation of Chinese state nationalism and its interaction
with civic values in Hong Kong and Hong Kong identity, we systematically
examine the results of identity surveys conducted in Hong Kong from 2010
to 2016. The track surveys were conducted by means of computer-assisted
telephone interviews (CATI) with representative samples of the Hong Kong
population. The surveys contained questions asking respondents to declare
their cultural identities, their cultural affiliation to Hong Kong and China,
their connection with mainland China, and their cultural impressions of
mainland Chinese. These studies were all administered in October so as to
avoid seasonal variation. A total of four surveys were conducted from 2010
to 2016. These CATI surveys covered Cantonese-speaking residents of Hong
Kong aged 18 and above. (1) Interviewees were chosen by a random sampling
of Hong Kong household telephone numbers. The “next birthday rule” was
carried out whenever more than one household member was eligible to be
interviewed. Response rates of the six surveys ranged from 35% to 65%, (2)
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1. As Cantonese is the dominant spoken language in Hong Kong, the surveys were conducted in
Cantonese. According to the census data of Hong Kong, 95.8% and 94.6% of the entire population
used Cantonese as their spoken language or other language in 2011 and 2016 respectively. Al-
though the surveys by-passed the non-Cantonese speaking population, we believe the sampling
covers most of the population. The survey data are therefore representative of the Hong Kong
population. 
2. Response rates ranged from 52% to 65% when the surveys were conducted from 2006 to 2010.
Yet, it dropped to 35% in the 2014 survey and increased a little to 39% in 2016 survey. Declining
survey response rates have become common in Hong Kong in recent years, as people have become
less tolerant of the rising number of tele-surveys.  
with an acceptable sampling error ranging from +/- 3.1% to +/- 3.5%. We
obtained a total of 937 samples in 2010, 816 samples in 2012, 797 samples
in 2014, and 797 samples in 2016. 
We re-organised the survey findings by sorting the following key variables:
• Chinese state nationalism
Three 5-point scale questions (1 = highly disagree, 5 = highly agree) are
identified as indicators of Chinese state nationalism: pride in China’s na-
tional flag, pride in China’s national anthem, and pride in China’s army (Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army, PLA). Pride in the national flag, anthem, and military
presence are the most common cultural icons representing people’s political
allegiance and loyalty to the state. Pride in these statist icons is illustrative
of the existence of Chinese state nationalism in Hong Kong. 
• Perception of civic rights in Hong Kong
We select four 5-point scale questions (1 = highly disagree, 5 = highly
agree) as indicators of how Hong Kong people value civic rights in their city.
They are: “Hong Kong people treasure press freedom,” “Hong Kong people
treasure freedom of speech,” “Hong Kong people treasure equal opportu-
nity,” and “Hong Kong people treasure privacy.” These freedoms and civic
rights demonstrate the significance of liberties and human rights that have
become embedded in the citizenship of Hong Kong in the decades since its
late colonial period. 
• Perception of civic qualities in Hong Kong
We identify four 5-point scale questions (1 = highly disagree, 5 = highly
agree) as indicators of how Hong Kong people value their civic qualities.
They are: “Hong Kong people are friendly,” “Hong Kong people are self-
disciplined,” “Hong Kong people are compassionate,” and “Hong Kong peo-
ple have independent thinking.” As discussed in the literature review, the
formation of Hong Kong identity explicates a discrepancy between civic
qualities possessed by Hong Kong people and mainland Chinese. These
questions are illustrative of the civic qualities perceived by Hong Kong
people. 
• Hong Kong’s icons
To solicit people’s cultural pride on Hong Kong identity, we identify three
cultural icons representing Hong Kong: Victoria Harbour (a famous tourist
spot in Hong Kong), Cantonese (the local dialect in Hong Kong), and the
candlelight vigil for the June 4th Incident (an annual ritual in Hong Kong
commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Incident in Beijing). Respondents
were asked to grade them on a 5-point scale (1 = highly disagree, 5 = highly
agree) in order to show whether they were proud of these icons. Victoria
Harbour suggests a general sense of belonging to the city. Cantonese spec-
ifies Hong Kong identity by differentiating the spoken language of the city
from China’s official spoken language, Putonghua. The candlelight vigil for
the June 4th Incident connotes an important collective memory of Hong
Kong identity (Chan and Lee 2010). Hong Kong is the only place under Chi-
nese rule that allows public mourning for victims of the 1989 Tiananmen
massacre. That makes the candlelight vigil for the June 4th Incident a signif-
icant cultural icon of Hong Kong. 
• Chinese icons
The literature review for this article has explicated the significance of ethnic
appeal in the construction of Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong. We there-
fore focus on two items from the survey data: cultural pride in the Great
Wall of China and Putonghua. The Great Wall is one of the Seven Wonders
of the World and symbolises Chinese history, while Putonghua is the official
national language of China. Both indicate an ethnic bonding to Chinese na-
tionhood. 
• China-Hong Kong trans-border experience
Previous research shows that Hong Kong people with a richer trans-border
experience and connection with mainland China show a stronger sympathy
toward Chinese nationalism (Ma, Fung, and Lam 2011). We therefore con-
structed an index expressing the China-Hong Kong trans-border experience
of respondents to the surveys. We designed three questions: “How fre-
quently do you travel to mainland China?” (1 = once a month or more
often, 0 = less than once a month), “Do you have a connection with rela-
tives, classmates and / or colleagues who are mainland Chinese?” (1 = Yes,
2 = No), and “Have you ever lived in mainland China for one year or more?”
(1 = Yes, 2 = No). Scores were added up to yield a component score for
each respondent, and a China-Hong Kong trans-border experience index
was compiled. 
Findings
Table 1 shows the mean scores of the key variables and their components.
Firstly, respondents show a flagging pride in Chinese state nationalism from
2010 to 2016. Hong Kong people’s pride in China’s national flag and anthem
dropped from 3.50 and 3.55 (out of 5 marks) respectively in 2010 to slightly
below 3 in 2016. Likewise, Hong Kong people’s pride in China’s army also
showed an obvious slide from 2.91 in 2010 to 2.44 in 2016. Meanwhile, re-
spondents’ pride in Chinese icons representing an ethnic bonding of Chinese
nationhood also dipped accordingly. Hong Kong people’s pride in the Great
Wall, which stood at 4.03 in 2010, decreased to 3.53 in 2016. Hong Kong
people also illustrated a shrinking affection toward China’s official language
Putonghua, with the mean score dropping from 2.94 in 2010 to 2.44 in
2016.
While Hong Kong people are less proud of Chinese state nationalism and
its ethnic appeal, they simultaneously demonstrate an adamant embrace
of the civic values of their hometown, in particular the aspect of liberties
and human rights. Table 1 shows that respondents strongly agree that Hong
Kong people treasure press freedom, freedom of speech, equal opportunity,
and privacy throughout the study period. The mean scores of these four
items remained steadily above 4 from 2010 to 2016. Relatively speaking,
respondents indicate lower mean scores to the survey items representing
the civic qualities of Hong Kong people when compared to those of civic
rights. However, the mean scores of civic qualities are in general higher than
those of Chinese state nationalism and Chinese icons conveying ethnic
bonding of Chinese nationhood. The data hence inform us that Hong Kong
people have a high regard for the civic values of their hometown, especially
liberties and human rights. 
Table 1 illustrates respondents’ pride in cultural icons. The higher the pride,
the stronger the Hong Kong identity. Contrary to the flagging mean scores
of Chinese state nationalism and Chinese icons showing ethnic bonding of
Chinese nationhood, pride in Hong Kong’s cultural icons vary across the
years. Hong Kong people’s pride in the renowned Victoria Harbour remained
stable from 2010 to 2016. They also showed a stronger pride in their spoken
language Cantonese from 2012 to 2016. (3) However, Hong Kong people
demonstrated a lower pride in the candlelight vigil for the June 4th Incident.
A possible explanation is that the Chinese nationalistic sentiment conveyed
by the June 4th Incident—the annual ritual largely stems from an ethnic
bonding of Chinese nationhood with the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen
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massacre—may not be substantially compatible with increasing China-Hong
Kong conflicts in recent years. Last but not least, Table 1 indicates that Hong
Kong people generally maintain some degree of trans-border connection
with mainland Chinese society. Rising China-Hong Kong conflicts have not
apparently hindered trans-border connections throughout the study period.
To further analyse the data, we consolidated the survey items into three
construct variables of “Chinese state nationalism” (pride in China’s national
flag, anthem, and army), “Perception of civic rights” (mean scores showing
respondents’ regard for liberties and human rights in Hong Kong), and “Per-
ception of civic qualities” (mean scores showing respondents’ regard for
civic qualities in Hong Kong) for further regression analysis. The figures in
Table 1 suggest acceptable levels of Cornbach’s Alpha for the above con-
struct variables. The three survey items for Hong Kong’s icons are less con-
sistent with each other (the pattern of mean scores for the candlelight vigil
for the June 4th Incident is different from that for the other two items), and
the two survey items for Chinese icons also manifest varying patterns. We
therefore do not group them into the construct variables for further analysis.    
Table 2 is the regression analysis of Chinese state nationalism as the de-
pendent variable of the models. The first finding is that the variances for
Chinese state nationalism are largely explained by people’s pride in Chinese
icons pertinent to ethnic Chinese nationhood, but are minimally related to
the civic values of Hong Kong. Throughout the years from 2010 to 2016,
the Chinese icons of Putonghua and the Great Wall contributed the largest
variance to the regression models (as indicated by the relatively large R2
change and their significance). On the other hand, the R2 changes indicated
by the civic values of Hong Kong are only statistically significant in 2010
and 2014, not to mention the low absolute values of the scores. In general,
perception of civic rights is unrelated to Chinese state nationalism. Percep-
tion of civic qualities shows a weak negative relationship to Chinese state
nationalism in 2012. The findings demonstrate that Chinese state nation-
alism in Hong Kong is primarily constituted by Chinese ethnic appeal, and
fails to articulate to the robust civic values of the city. 
Closer scrutiny unravels an intriguing relationship between Hong Kong
identity and Chinese state nationalism. The Hong Kong icon of Victoria Har-
bour generally shows a positive relationship with Chinese state nationalism.
Cantonese demonstrates a weak positive relationship with Chinese state
nationalism in 2012, but no significant relationship in 2014 and 2016. Table
1 indicates a relatively high mean scores of pride in Victoria Harbour and
Cantonese. Coupled with the data of tables 1 and 2, we conclude that pur-
suance of a Hong Kong identity does not hamper people’s affiliation with
Chinese state nationalism. This finding is somewhat contradictory to the
views of Hong Kong localism, a discourse that frames Hong Kong identity
as the opposite of Chinese nationalism (Chan 2017; Fong 2017).  
Another point to note is the negative relationship between the candlelight
vigil for the June 4th Incident and Chinese state nationalism. This finding
could be explained by Hong Kong people’s collective memory of the June
4th Incident—the local movement points directly to the culpability of Chi-
nese leaders for their suppression of the student movement in 1989. This
political stance inevitably challenges political allegiance to the incumbent
Chinese regime, and hence curbs state nationalism. Another finding of Table
2 is the significant and slightly positive correlation between China-Hong
Kong trans-border experience and Chinese state nationalism. Although con-
nection with mainland Chinese society could be conducive to cultivating
Chinese state nationalism, the contribution of such habitual practices and
living experience should not be exaggerated based on the data in Table 2.
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Table 1 – Chinese state nationalism, perception of
civic rights and qualities, pride in Hong Kong icons,
pride in Chinese icons, and China-Hong Kong trans-




2010 2012 2014 2016
Pride in national flag 3.50 3.01 2.80 2.95
Pride in national
anthem
3.55 3.02 2.84 2.92
Pride in Chinese army 2.91 2.42 2.21 2.44
Cornbach’s Alpha 0.889 0.905 0.902 0.933
Perception of 
civic rights* 
2010 2012 2014 2016
HK people treasure
press freedom
4.51 4.54 4.57 4.43
HK people treasure
freedom of speech
4.52 4.59 4.61 4.48
HK people treasure
equal opportunity
4.31 4.30 4.31 4.20
HK people 
treasure privacy
4.29 4.28 4.29 4.26
Cornbach’s Alpha 0.827 0.791 0.834 0.849
Perception of 
civic qualities*  
2010 2012 2014 2016
HK people are friendly 3.69 3.64 3.67 3.49
HK people are 
self-disciplined
3.89 3.92 3.94 3.74
HK people are
compassionate
3.98 3.97 3.96 3.78
HK people have
independent thinking
3.80 3.75 3.82 3.63
Cornbach’s Alpha 0.795 0.743 0.742 0.778
Hong Kong’s icons* 2010 2012 2014 2016
Victoria Harbour 3.93 3.91 3.87 4.04
Cantonese N/A 3.62 3.72 3.93
Candlelight vigil for
June 4th  Incident
N/A 2.96 2.94 2.63
Chinese icons* 2010 2012 2014 2016
Great Wall 4.03 3.71 3.42 3.53




1.32 1.51 1.37 1.40
*1 = highly disagree, 5 = highly agree
# Range from 0 to 3
Chinese state nationalism in Hong Kong is so far still mainly nurtured by
the ethnic appeal of Chinese nationhood. 
Table 2 indicates that two demographic items are to a certain extent sig-
nificant to the degree of Chinese state nationalism. Education level shows
a significant negative relationship in 2010, 2012, and 2016. The age of re-
spondents indicates a slightly positive relationship in 2010 and 2014. Family
income illustrates a less stable relationship throughout the study period: a
slightly positive relationship in 2010, but a somewhat negative relationship
in 2014. Tables 3 and 4 below attempt to further uncover the possible im-
pact of education level and age on the construction of Chinese state na-
tionalism.
Table 3 indicates a correlational analysis between Chinese state national-
ism and pride in Cantonese, pride in Victoria Harbour, and the perception
of civic rights and civic qualities. Pride in Cantonese and Victoria Harbour,
and the perception of civic rights and qualities all yield high mean scores in
the surveys (see Table 1), therefore amply representing Hong Kong’s identity.
The other two variables inform the perceived civic values that proliferate in
Hong Kong. Table 3 examines the education level of respondents: those who
received matriculation education or below, and those who received under-
graduate and post-graduate education. 
Table 3 shows that less-educated people demonstrate a stronger correla-
tion between Chinese state nationalism and Cantonese than highly-edu-
cated people. For pride in Victoria Harbour and its correlation with Chinese
state nationalism, less-educated people show a stronger correlation in 2010
and 2012 than highly educated people, but a weaker one in 2014 and 2016.
Despite the mixed pattern, pride in Victoria Harbour is generally positive to
Chinese state nationalism. The findings show that pride in Cantonese or Vic-
toria Harbour does not imply cultural resistance to the Chinese state. Less-
educated people even have a stronger tendency to consider Cantonese as
part of the Chinese language. Stable and positive correlations between Chi-
nese state nationalism and Hong Kong’s icons indicates that both highly
educated and less-educated people tend not to regard Hong Kong identity
as cultural resistance to statist loyalty to China. The negative coefficient of
education level in regression analysis (Table 2) could be explained by less-
educated people demonstrating a stronger connection between Chinese
state nationalism and Hong Kong identity vis-à-vis their highly educated
counterparts.  
Perceptions of Hong Kong’s civic rights and qualities do not show any sig-
nificant correlation with Chinese state nationalism in 2012 and 2016. The
correlation between civic rights and Chinese state nationalism is weak in
2010, yet less-educated people show a relatively stronger correlation be-
tween perceptions of civic qualities to Chinese state nationalism than do
their highly educated counterparts in the same year. The most striking find-
ing is that both perceptions demonstrate significant negative correlation
with Chinese state nationalism in 2014, the year when the Occupy move-
ment broke out and China and Hong Kong experienced major political con-
flicts over democratisation. Highly educated people showed a stronger
negative correlation between perception of Hong Kong’s civic qualities and
Chinese state nationalism in 2014. Other than in 2014, perceptions of Hong
Kong civic rights and qualities generally do not strongly and stably correlate
with Chinese state nationalism when compared with pride in Hong Kong’s
icons. 
Generally speaking, the effect of education levels on the formation of Chi-
nese state nationalism is mixed over time, and is far from displaying a con-
sistent pattern. People with higher education levels are less proud of Chinese
state nationalism in general (as shown in the regression analysis of Table
2). Further correlational analysis of Table 3 reveals that while people with
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Table 2 – Regression analysis of Chinese state 
nationalism# 
Demographics 2010 2012 2014 2016
Gender -0.21 -0.013 -0.007 -0.21
Age 0.079*** 0.050 0.095*** 0.032
Education -0.119*** -0.124*** -0.025 -0.133***
Family income 0.066** -0.040 -0.060* 0.007
R2  change of
demographics
0.057*** 0.063*** 0.100*** 0.139***
Civic values of 
Hong Kong 
2010 2012 2014 2016
Perception of 
civic rights
-0.006 0.002 -0.020 0.031
Perception of 
civic qualities
0.001 -0.069* -0.030 -0.021
R2  change  of civic
values of Hong Kong
0.019*** 0.000 0.035*** 0.003
Hong Kong’s icons 2010 2012 2014 2016
Victoria Harbour 0.064** 0.123*** -0.003 0.079***
Cantonese N/A 0.066* 0.040 0.028
June 4th 
candlelight vigil
N/A -0.158*** -0.204*** -0.174***
R2  change  of 
Hong Kong’s icons
0.122*** 0.188*** 0.179*** 0.150***
Chinese icons 2010 2012 2014 2016
Putonghua 0.405*** 0.395*** 0.421*** 0.487***
Great Wall 0.389*** 0.329*** 0.335*** 0.284***
R2  change  of 
Chinese icons
0.385*** 0.316*** 0.301*** 0.423***




0.083*** 0.082** 0.093*** 0.087***




0.006*** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.007***
Adjusted R2 0.590*** 0.566*** 0.623*** 0.716***
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
# Dependent variable: Chinese state nationalism, missing values are subject to pair-
wise analysis
higher education levels show a lower correlation between Chinese state na-
tionalism and pride in Cantonese (since 2012) and Victoria Harbour (in 2010
and 2012), the correlation itself is still positive, which means that Hong
Kong residents do not regard Hong Kong identity as resistance to Chinese
state nationalism. Education levels also do not show a strong and robust
impact on the correlation between perception of civil rights and qualities
and Chinese state nationalism. 
Table 4 captures the age division of respondents and its impact on the
correlations between Chinese state nationalism and all the variables listed
in Table 3. People aged 30 or above demonstrate a stronger correlation be-
tween Cantonese and Chinese state nationalism than people aged 29 or
below. The age division does not show a consistent impact on the correla-
tion between their pride in Victoria Harbour and Chinese state nationalism,
as the young cohort (people aged 29 or below) show a stronger correlation
in 2010 and 2016, but not in 2012 and 2014. However, a conclusion is that
icons belonging to Hong Kong (Cantonese and Victoria Harbour) once again
do not represent a negative correlation with Chinese state nationalism to
either young or adult cohorts (people aged 30 or above). 
Correlations between perception of civic rights and qualities in Hong Kong
and Chinese state nationalism, on the contrary, show an intriguing pattern.
The adult cohort does not show a stable correlation between civic rights and
qualities and Chinese state nationalism except for an apparent negative cor-
relation in 2014, the year the Umbrella Movement was launched in Hong
Kong. This exceptional year could be explained by the extremity of China-
Hong Kong conflicts over democratisation that year. The young cohort, how-
ever, demonstrates a positive correlation between Chinese state nationalism
and perceptions of Hong Kong’s civic rights and qualities in 2010, and an even
stronger correlation in 2016. This finding of the young cohort can be read in
two ways. The first is that young people perceive a compatibility between
Chinese state nationalism and Hong Kong’s civic rights and qualities specifi-
cally in 2016, two years after the 2014 Umbrella Movement. This reading,
however, drastically contrasts with studies that document youth activism in
Hong Kong, and find that Hong Kong youth by default detest Chinese state
nationalism in the post-handover years (Chan 2013). An alternative reading
is that this positive correlation in fact indicates a reduced recognition of Hong
Kong’s civic rights and qualities among young people after the Umbrella
Movement. By this logic, it means that young people disappointed with the
stalled democratisation of Hong Kong and the hard-line approach of China
in 2014 at the same time express a declining appraisal of Hong Kong’s civic
rights and qualities. A closer scrutiny of the descriptive data gives stronger
evidence of the second explanation. Mean scores for Hong Kong’s civic rights
and qualities among the young cohort decreased from 18.02 and 15.25 in
2014 to 16.65 and 13.85 in 2016, respectively. Meanwhile, mean scores for
Hong Kong’s civic rights and qualities among the adult cohort maintained a
stable level (2014: civic rights = 17.73, civic qualities = 15.43; 2016: civic
rights = 17.56, civic qualities = 14.83) after the Umbrella Movement.
Discussion 
The data in this article explicate empirical evidence responding to the
three research questions delineated by the literature review. The first ques-
tion is: to what extent has China successfully promoted Chinese state na-
tionalism in post-handover Hong Kong? Shrinking cultural pride in China’s
national flag, anthem, and army from 2010 to 2016 indicates that the active
dissemination of Chinese state nationalism in Hong Kong has not met with
positive response. By 2016, the mean scores for the aforementioned three
items all fell below the “neutral” midpoint of the 5-point scale. Hong Kong
people are also less proud of cultural icons (the Great Wall and the Chinese
national language Putonghua) that represent their ethnic Chinese ties. Such
findings, together with data regarding civic values, are a direct rejoinder to
the second research question: to what extent is Chinese state nationalism
compatible with the civic values of post-handover Hong Kong? Survey data
illustrate that Hong Kong people robustly cling to their civic rights and civic
qualities. Regression analysis, however, informs us that such cherished civic
values in Hong Kong are quite independent of the formation of Chinese
state nationalism. Generally speaking, civic values in Hong Kong neither
contribute to nor substantially oppose political allegiance to the Chinese
regime. The point to note here is the correlational analysis showing that
Hong Kong’s civic values are negatively correlated to Chinese state nation-
alism in 2014, the year when China and Hong Kong experienced enormous
political conflicts over the process of democratisation. This finding reminds
us that China may risk losing political allegiance in Hong Kong if it forcefully
curtails the city’s civic values. 
The third research question is: to what extent is Chinese state nationalism
compatible with Hong Kong identity? In fact, Hong Kong identity consists
of various cultural imaginaries with different implications for Chinese state
nationalism. Our data show that people’s pride in Victoria Harbour (a gen-
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* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
# Dependent variable: Chinese state nationalism
Table 3 – Correlations between Chinese state na-
tionalism, Hong Kong’s icons, perception of Hong

















N/A 0.362*** 0.089* 0.217***
Undergrad and
postgrad level




0.307*** 0.381*** 0.032 0.062
Undergrad and
postgrad level




0.135** 0.199*** -0.123* -0.113*
Undergrad and
postgrad level




0.188*** 0.270*** -0.002 -0.018
Undergrad and
postgrad level
0.113* 0.344*** -0.079 0.074
2016
eral sense of belonging to Hong Kong) and Cantonese (the predominant
spoken language in Hong Kong) do not result in resistance to Chinese state
nationalism. Informed by regression analysis, we could argue that people
who are proud of Victoria Harbour are also slightly more faithful to China.
However, those who support the candlelight vigil for the June 4th Incident
(the annual ritual commemorating China’s suppression of the 1989 demo-
cratic movement) tend not to embrace Chinese state nationalism. Contrary
to media representations and the social imaginary of China-Hong Kong con-
flicts in recent years, our findings indicate that Hong Kong identity is a so-
phisticated social contingency that cannot be simplified as a cultural rival
to Chinese state nationalism. 
In a nutshell, Chinese state nationalism in Hong Kong provides an em-
pirical case study for examining ethnic-civic dialogue, if not contestation,
in the course of China’s construction of nationalism in Hong Kong. It tes-
tifies to the incongruence between the ethnic appeal of nationhood and
the civic values stemming from a combination of colonial legacy, Hong
Kong’s unique development, and its cosmopolitan outlook. While tradi-
tional and ethnic ties as well as China’s global rise could buttress the im-
plementation of Chinese state nationalism in Hong Kong, modernisation,
including political development, in its late colonial period has endowed
the city with civic values of liberty, human rights, law and order, and
lifestyle that are starkly different from those in mainland China. To secure
the political allegiance of Hong Kong after the handover, China has ma-
nipulated the ethnic bonds of Chinese nationalism by appealing to empa-
thy with Chinese nationhood. This article, however, empirically shows that
the nationalistic call for ethnic unity cannot easily override the incompat-
ibility of civic values. We have witnessed a weakening Chinese state na-
tionalism in Hong Kong in recent years. We have seen the robustness of
civic values in this city, in particular the ever-increasing importance of civil
liberties and human rights in public discourse. Those civic values closely
adhere to the desire for democratisation, constitutional freedom, and in-
dividualised and cosmopolitan lifestyle (protection of privacy, friendliness
to others, self-discipline for mutual respect, etc.) that are also common
denominators in other global cities such as London, New York, Paris, and
Tokyo. The story of Chinese state nationalism in Hong Kong elucidates the
limitations of ethnic appeal in the epoch of globalisation, when the civic
values of democracy, freedom, and individual rights became the common
language of the human world. 
However, our data also reveal the subtle power of ethnic appeal in the con-
struction of nationalism. While failing to enhance Hong Kong people’s polit-
ical loyalty to China, Chinese state nationalism has so far not induced
substantial cultural resistance originating from Hong Kong people’s civic val-
ues and identity. As reiterated in this article, Hong Kong’s civic values are
generally irrelevant and have yet to become resistant to the construction of
Chinese state nationalism. Some of Hong Kong’s cultural icons even exhibit
a positive relationship to political allegiance to China. As informed by the
previous studies, the social formation of Hong Kong society has been largely
subject to the development of China as such—a nationalistic sentiment
about building up a stronger and modern China since the late Qing period,
the ethnic bonding resulting from familial networks in mainland China, the
trans-border living experience due to socio-economic interaction between
China and Hong Kong, and even the shared sense of ethnic history and na-
tional glory between Hong Kong people and mainland Chinese to a certain
extent. Even the young and well-educated cohorts of the Hong Kong popu-
lation do not demonstrate obvious defiance of Chinese state nationalism. 
Yet, this tenacity of Chinese ethnic appeal in Hong Kong will be subject
to further challenges if China insists on defying the liberties, human rights,
current lifestyle, and cultural identity of Hong Kong. Correlational analysis
shows that the civic values of Hong Kong tend to be negatively related to
Chinese state nationalism in 2014, the year when China and Hong Kong
had formidable conflicts over democratisation and freedom during the Um-
brella Movement. Moreover, regression analysis demonstrates that Chinese
state nationalism in Hong Kong primarily relies on the ethnic appeal of Chi-
nese nationhood. However, Hong Kong people are less proud of the Chinese
national language and historical relics in recent years. We believe that wors-
ening civic-ethnic tension in Chinese state nationalism will further delay
and deter Hong Kong’s political allegiance to China, as Hong Kong people
generally show a significant inertia regarding their existing civic values,
lifestyle, and local identity. 
In addition, our survey data focus on the Cantonese-speaking community
in Hong Kong rather than Hong Kong as a whole. As most of the Hong Kong
population speaks Cantonese, the representativeness of our samples is not
considered problematic now. However, the identity formation of non-Can-
tonese speaking residents of Hong Kong, in particular non-Chinese people,
is also a significant topic when studying Hong Kong identity and its dynamics
with Chinese state nationalism as more mainland Chinese have settled in
Hong Kong since 1997. Could there be non-Cantonese speaking citizens who
pledge loyalty to China in Hong Kong in future? Would this sector of the
Hong Kong community be regarded as local subjects? These research ques-
tions could complicate the construction of Chinese state nationalism in
Hong Kong. 
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* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
# Dependent variable: Chinese state nationalism
Table 4 – Correlations between Chinese state 
nationalism, Hong Kong’s icons, perception of















Aged 29 or below N/A 0.455*** 0.163* 0.166*
Aged 30 or above N/A 0.332*** 0.063 0.193***
2010
Aged 29 or below 0.222** 0.317*** 0.042 0.060
Aged 30 or above 0.306*** 0.326*** 0.006 0.032
2012
Aged 29 or below -0.103 0.168** -0.068 -0.096
Aged 30 or above 0.145*** 0.235*** -0.114** -0.122**
2014
Aged 29 or below 0.102 0.289*** 0.312*** 0.365***
Aged 30 or above 0.187*** 0.276*** -0.002 0.007
2016
Conclusion
Chinese state nationalism in post-handover Hong Kong empirically shows
the polemic deliberation of ethnic-civic dialogue in constructing national-
ism. Hong Kong presents an illustrative case study that demonstrates the
contradiction and confrontation between ethnic appeal and civic values
when a state attempts to strategically construct its nationalism in a newly-
integrated city. Ethnic nationhood is embedded in historical legacy and
myths that are unequivocally significant to the nationalistic empathy, but
modernisation and globalisation inevitably bring about civic values that
challenge the political legitimacy of the state and advocate individual rights
and freedoms. That makes the ethnic-civic dialogue a pressing agenda in
the construction of nationalism and its state legitimacy. 
Certainly, construction of nationalism does not necessarily imply a di-
chotomy between civic values and ethnic values. National glory and pride
could incorporate civic values, as in the case of the French Revolution and the
American War of Independence, which can be considered indispensable parts
of French and American nationalism. However, China is pursuing a governing
legitimacy that counts on state nationalism rather than civic values in a more
or less top-down approach, at a time when local demand is for a quicker pace
of democratisation and a stronger version of liberties and civic rights. The story
of Hong Kong therefore epitomises the ethnic-civic tension of Chinese state
nationalism on which China relies for the political legitimacy of its partisan
leadership. It shows how a nation-making process is problemised by reliance
on ethnic unity that takes minimal account of the pursuance of liberties and
civic rights.  
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